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Abstract:  
This dissertation analyses how firms operate in capital market-oriented economies 
and bank-oriented economies determine their capital structure, taking into account the 
impact of institutional variables and the subprime crisis. This is relevant because only few 
studies of capital structure have concentrated in analyzing the implications of the financial 
orientation of the economy taking into account the effect of the subprime crisis in the 
choices of capital structure of a company. Using panel data and a two-step system-GMM 
procedure, we analyzed if there was a target of leverage and what was the speed of 
adjustment for that target. Thomson Reuters Datastream database was the main database 
used for this study and the sample includes companies of the G5 for the period 2000 to 
2015. Our main findings show that after the subprime crisis companies use more debt 
than equity and use more short-term debt than long-term debt. Most profitable companies 
used less debt and companies with more tangible assets and bigger size use more debt 
than equity. This effect increases after de subprime crisis because fixed assets have a more 
important role in approval of bank financing. Finally, the most strong result is that exist 
a target of leverage confirming the trade-off theory. 
Keywords 
Capital Structure, Subprime crisis, Institutional environment 
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Resumo 
Esta dissertação analisa a forma como as empresas que operam em economias 
orientadas para o mercado de capital e para as instituições financeiras determinam a sua 
estrutura de capital, tendo em conta o impacto das variáveis institucionais e da crise do 
subprime. Isto é relevante, pois poucos estudos sobre a estrutura de capital concentraram-
se em analisar as implicações da orientação financeira da economia tendo em conta o 
efeito da crise do subprime na maneira como as empresas se financiam. Usando dados 
em painel e um processo two-step sytem-GMM, analisamos se existia uma alavancagem 
alvo e se sim, qual a velocidade de ajustamento para ela. A principal base de dados 
utilizada foi a Thomson Reuters Datastream e a amostra era constituída por empresas do 
G5 para o período 2000 a 2015. Os nossos principais resultados mostram que depois da 
crise do subprime as empresas usaram mais divida que capital e usaram mais dívida de 
curto prazo do que longo prazo. As empresas mais rentáveis usam menos dívida que 
capital e por sua vez, as empresas com mais ativos tangíveis e maior dimensão usam mais 
dívida que capital. Depois da crise do subprime, este efeito acentua-se pois os ativos fixos 
passam a ter um papel mais importante na aprovação dos empréstimos financeiros. Por 
fim, o resultado mais significativo é que existe uma alavancagem alvo, confirmando a 
teoria do trade-off. 
Palavras-Chave: 
Estrutura de Capital, Crise Subprime, Ambiente Institucional  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The capital structure of firms has been widely discussed in the world of corporate 
finance and the related literature has grown extensively in the last decades. The study of 
capital structure is an important subject because companies need resources to finance their 
projects and for that purpose need to choose between equity and debt.  The analyze of the 
choice of the capital structure of a company and its impact became even more important 
after with the subprime crisis. The subprime crisis is considered by many economists the 
worst financial crisis since the 1930s Great Depression. This period was marked by a 
credit crunch that played a crucial role in the failure of business, a decline in consumers 
wealth and a downturn in economic activity leading to the 2008-2012 global recession 
(Akbar et al. 2013; Harrison & Wisnu Widjaja 2014; Alves & Francisco 2015; Gonzalez 
2015).  This is important because the subprime crisis led to losses in many financial 
institutions, which might reduce the availability of credit and increase the cost of 
accessing credit. 
In the literature related with the capital structure , only few studies have 
concentrated in analyzing the implications of the financial orientation of the economy and 
those that exist use a sample prior to the subprime crisis (Antoniou et al. 2008; Alves & 
Ferreira 2011; Acedo-Ramirez & Ruiz-Cabestre 2014). Although, a deep analysis of the 
implications of the traditions of capital market-oriented and bank-oriented economies on 
the capital structure decision is important because they have direct implications on the 
sources of funds available to the corporate sector. So, the lessons learned from one 
environment cannot be generalized to countries with different legal and institutional 
traditions. 
Generally, empirical studies focus on identifying the firm-specific factors that 
managers should consider in the choice of capital structure (Akbar et al. 2013; Harrison 
& Wisnu Widjaja 2014), while them ignore the possible implications of institutional 
conditions that could affect the choice of the financing mix. However, there are already 
some studies that take into account institutional conditions (Antoniou et al. 2008; Alves 
& Ferreira 2011; Acedo-Ramirez & Ruiz-Cabestre 2014; Alves & Francisco 2015; 
Gonzalez 2015; Öztekin 2015). 
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In addition, it is apparent that the role and strength of factors which influence firms’ 
capital structure decisions do change over time. Furthermore, for a clear understanding 
of the dynamic aspects of a capital structure determinants, it wouldn’t be enough a cross-
section analysis of leverage ratios alone. Therefore, it is important to analyse whether 
corporations react to new circumstances that occur in financial markets and how quickly 
they revert to their target capital structure when moved away by random events (Antoniou 
et al. 2008; Acedo-Ramirez & Ruiz-Cabestre 2014; Öztekin 2015). 
Therefore, the aim of this study is analyses how firms that operate in capital market-
oriented economies and bank-oriented economies determine their capital structure, taking 
into account the impact of institutional environmental and the subprime crisis. 
Additionally, using panel data and a two-step system-GMM procedure, we analyzed if 
there was a target of leverage and what was the speed of adjustment for that target. 
Our paper contributes to the extant literature on capital structure of firms on an 
empirical level. Firstly, we analyze the effect of a financial shock on capital structure 
choices of a company and extend the period of analysis, ranging from 2000 to 2015. 
Secondly, we analyze the implications of the financial orientation of the economy by 
analysing the determinants of capital structure in the G5 countries, which have different 
financial and institutional traditions1. Thirdly, we extend the literature by analyze the 
possible implications of institutional environment on capital structure decisions. Finally, 
we extend the literature by incorporating a dynamic perspective on models of leverage by 
analysing panel data using a two-step system-Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
procedure. To the best of our knowledge, no work has been done with this set of 
specifications. 
The main results of this dissertation show that after the subprime crisis companies 
use more debt than equity and use more short-term debt than long-term debt. Most 
profitable companies used less debt and companies with more tangible assets and bigger 
size use more debt and after de subprime crisis the intensity increased because fixed assets 
                                                 
1 U.S. and U.K. are market-based economies and Japan, France and Germany are bank-based 
economies. 
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have a more important role in approval of bank financing. The impact of growth 
opportunities and NDTS change across the dependent variables used and across countries. 
Accordingly to previous literature, for the control variables and in contrast with the firm-
level variables, the impact on leverage and financing choices is inconclusive. Finally, the 
most strong result is that exist a target of leverage confirming the trade-off theory. 
The remaining dissertation is organized as follows:  Section II presents an overview 
of the related literature and developed hypotheses.  Section III presents the sample 
selection criteria, the variables definition and the methodology that we used in our study. 
Section IV describes the empirical findings. Finally,  section V and VI  present  the 
conclusion and the references consulted in this research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH 
HYPOTHESES 
I. Subprime Crisis 
The subprime crisis was a global crunch and its impact on financial deregulation 
cannot be left aside. The repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in the US in 1999, which put an 
end to the separation between commercial banks and investment banks, created 
conditions for industrial corporations to increase their leverage. As a result, new financial 
products emerged, but financial institutions weren’t able to monitoring such products. In 
the Europe the experience of shadow banking was tolerated, sometimes promoted, and 
risk management was weakened, leaving banking supervisory authorities completely lost. 
Thus, the levels of leverage increased without the level of risk being adequately taken 
into account. On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothersfiled for Chaper 11 bankruptcy 
protection sending shockwaves around the world. Custódio et al. (2013), Alves & 
Francisco (2015) and Gonzalez (2015) show that although the subprime crisis has created 
the conditions for the credit shocks and liquidity problems observed, it also had a positive 
impact on leverage, but through the issuance of short-term debt rather than long-term 
debt. In line with this, we expect that after the subprime crisis firms use more debt than 
equity and more short-term debt than long-term debt because the increase on the 
information asymmetries during the subprime crisis affected capital markers, leading 
companies to replace long-term debt by short-term debt and leaving the long-term debt 
markets for large firms.  
The above discussion lead us to the following hypotheses:  
H1: Firms use more debt than equity after subprime crisis. 
H2: Firms use more short-term debt than long-term debt after subprime crisis. 
II. Theories of Capital Structure and Firm-level variables  
Capital structure theory was born from the irrelevance theory of M&M (Modigliani 
& Miller 1958), who argue that in a perfect market the way how a firm is financed 
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becomes irrelevant to its own value. The M&M theory is based on a number of unrealistic 
assumptions and for that matter has been criticized for being purely theoretical. The 
criticisms against the irrelevance theory led M&M to modify their model, reflecting the 
idea that corporate tax system giving tax relief on the payments of interest (Modigliani & 
Miller 1963). 
However, M&M’s (1963) theoretical assumptions inspired several other theories. 
The two most influential theories were the Trade-off theory and the Pecking order theory. 
The Trade-off theory report us that an optimal capital structure is determined by the 
costs and benefits related with the use of debt  against equity. Consequently, firms must 
choose an optimal capital structure taking into account the trade-off of the marginal 
benefits and costs of debt after consider market imperfections such as agency costs, taxes 
and bankruptcy (Kraus & Litzenberger 1973; Miller 1977; Scott 1977). 
The pecking order theory is based on the existence of asymmetric information 
between  the managers of the company and shareholders about the future prospects of the 
company. This theory defends  a hierarchy in the financing decision, thus a firm´s capital 
structure is motivated by the desire to finance new investment by using internally 
generated funds, followed by debt and finally equity (Myers 1984; Myers & Majluf 1984). 
Most recently, the Market Timing Theory emerged and  argue that managers are 
indifferent between the various sources of financing from one period to another. They 
just use the "cheapest" financing source when the company needs financing (Baker & 
Wurgler 2002). 
To define the role of firm-specific factors on capital structure choice, several 
researches  based their investigation on the   theories of Capital Structure mentioned 
above  (Hovakimian et al. 2001; Antoniou et al. 2008; Alves & Ferreira 2011; Akbar et 
al. 2013; Custódio et al. 2013; Acedo-Ramirez & Ruiz-Cabestre 2014; Harrison & Wisnu 
Widjaja 2014; Muradoğlu et al. 2014; Alves & Francisco 2015; Gonzalez 2015; Öztekin 
2015). This firm-specific determinants  are: profitability, tangibility, growth 
opportunities, size and non-debt tax shield, because they are the most commonly used and 
those that presented  the most significant results in previous research. 
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Profitability (PROF) 
Trade-off and pecking order theories suggest that a firm’s profitability affects its 
financing mix. 
The trade-off theory holds that a profitability company should be more highly 
leverage in order to offset corporate taxes. Therefore, defends that exists a positive 
relationship between profitability and debt. 
Otherwise, the pecking order theory suggests that firms prefer to finance new 
investments from retained earnings and from the raise of debt, only if internal resources 
weren´t enough. Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Titman and Wessels (1988), among 
others, empirically confirmed this prediction. So, contrary to the trade-off theory, this 
theory defends a negative association between profitability and debt.  
Antoniou et al. (2008) found a stronger effect of the profitability on the capital 
structure of the firms from bank-based economies2 because these firms  are commonly 
closely held, while the corporate ownership in market-based nations is generally less 
concentrated. Therefore,  we expect  this effect to be stronger for France and Germany. 
. In line with this, we expect that profitability have a negative impact on leverage 
because the ability to retain earnings depend on profitability. For France and Germany 
we expect this effect to be more pronounced. 
Following the discussion above, we will test the following hypothesis: 
H3: Profitability has a negative impact on leverage. 
Tangibility (TANG) 
In the case of bankruptcy, tangible assets are more likely to have a market value, 
while intangible assets will lose value. Therefore, the risk of lending to firms with higher 
                                                 
2 Especially Germany and French 
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tangible assets is lower and lenders will required a lower risk premium (Antoniou et al. 
2008; Alves & Francisco 2015). 
According to Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Titman and Wessels (1988) tangible 
assets have a positive relation with leverage because the collateral may alleviate agency 
costs of debt. 
Finally, it is expected that with the subprime crisis the intensity of the relationship 
between tangibility and leverage will be higher, because fixed assets have a more 
important role in approval of bank financing. 
Therefore, it is expected a positive relation between leverage and  tangibility of 
assets. In traditional bank lending, the need for collateral is more pronounced, so it is 
expected that the role of asset tangibility will be more pronounced in bank-oriented 
economies (Antoniou et al. 2008). 
Therefore, we will test the following hypothesis: 
H4: Tangibility has a positive impact on leverage. 
Growth opportunities (GWOP) 
The trade-off theory defends that the cost of financial distress increases with 
expected growth, which forces managers to reduce the debt in their capital structure. 
Additionally, in presence of information asymmetries, companies issue equity instead of 
debt when overvaluation leads to higher expected growth (Antoniou et al. 2008; Alves & 
Ferreira 2011; Alves & Francisco 2015; Öztekin 2015). 
In otherwise, internal resources of growing companies may not be enough to 
finance their positive net profit value (NPV) of the investment opportunities and they may 
have to raise external capital. According to the pecking order theory, if companies require 
external finance, they issue debt before equity. So, in this case, growth opportunities 
should be positively associated with leverage (Harrison & Wisnu Widjaja 2014). 
 8 
 
Following Antoniou et al. (2008), growth opportunities should have a stronger 
negative impact on leverage in capital market-oriented economies than in bank-oriented 
economies. 
 In conclusion, the related studies have contradictory results in relation to the signal of 
the relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. Although, we expect a 
negative signal because is the signal found in more researches, but we do not leave 
completely apart the hypothesis of a positive signal. Following this line of thought,  we 
will test this hypothesis: 
H5: Growth opportunities have a negative impact on leverage. 
Size (SIZE) 
Generally, it’s accepted that firm size is an inverse proxy of the probability of 
bankruptcy. 
Trade-off theory suggest that larger firms are more diversified and have lower 
agency costs and financial distress, therefore, they are able to borrow more than other 
small companies. 
The pecking order theory suggests, like the trade-off theory, the existence of a 
positive relationship because larger companies give more information to market players 
and as a result obtain more easily new funding from creditors.  
However, some studies such as Cortez and Susanto (2012) analysed the relation 
between the firm’s specific experience and the level of debt. For that purpose, Cortez and 
Susanto (2012)  a sample of Japanese firms and found a negative association between size 
and the leverage. 
As most studies show a positive relationship (Antoniou et al. 2008; Alves & 
Ferreira 2011; Alves & Francisco 2015; Gonzalez 2015; Öztekin 2015) and regarding our 
sample specification we will test the following hypothesis: 
H6: Company size has a positive impact on leverage. 
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Non debt tax shield (NDTS) 
The impacts of tax on capital structure choice depends of the tax policy objectives, 
especially when the tax system is designed to favour the retention of earnings against 
dividend payout, or vice versa3. So, we expect that the impact of this factor to be different 
across countries. 
High tax rates increase the interest tax benefits of debt. For this reason, firms will 
issue more debt when tax rates are higher (Antoniou et al. 2008). On the other hand, 
Cortez and Susanto (2012) state that companies with larger NDTS are less indebted 
because NDTS are substitute for tax benefits of debt financing. 
The Trade-off theory defends that firms prefer debt because this gives a NDTS. 
That is why, with very high tax rates, firms will use more debt. So, NDTS has an indirect 
impact financial leverage. 
Accordingly to Acedo-Ramirez and Ruiz-Cabestre (2014), the relation between 
NDTS and leverage can be positive because companies with high effective tax rate have 
more incentive to use debt to obtain a higher interest tax shield. On the other hand, it can 
be negative because companies with NDTS have already enjoyed of tax benefits. 
Taking into account what has been discussed above, we hope that firms with high 
depreciation expenses have less need for the tax shield provided by debt financing. So, 
we will test the following hypothesis: 
H7: NDTS has a negative impact on leverage. 
                                                 
3 German tax system favours payout against retention, discouraging internal equity. In Japan the 
system favours dividends against retention. The French tax system encourages retention, reducing the need 
for external finance.  
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III. Economic Environment4 
Prior researches indicate that the institutional environment influences firms 
financing policies (Antoniou et al. 2008; Acedo-Ramirez & Ruiz-Cabestre 2014; Alves 
& Francisco 2015; Gonzalez 2015; Öztekin 2015).  
The economic environment has a different impact on the financing choices of firms 
in countries that have a different institutional setting. For this and taking into account the  
countries of the sample, we select four variables: general government gross debt (GGGD), 
current account debt (CAB), capital market development (CMD) and banking 
development (BD).  
General government gross debt (GGGD) 
According to Alves and Francisco (2015), the first decade of the 21th century was 
characterized by a varied supply of debt capital. Financial innovation and economic 
conditions created, on the one hand, conditions for financial institutions systematically 
restructure their balance sheets, and, on the other, for bank customers replace deposits by 
government and corporate bonds. Thus, the authors observed a simultaneous trend in the 
evaluation of government debt and private credit, and show that GGGD has a positive 
impact on corporate leverage, but not in short-term debt.  
Consequently, we expect  a positive impact of GGGD on corporate leverage: 
H8: GGGD has a positive impact on leverage. 
Current account balance (CAB) 
The current account balance is related to the level of competitiveness of an 
economy. A systematic current account surplus means a wealthy and competitive 
                                                 
4 The variables related with the economic environment are the control variables of our model.  
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economy: an economy with firms capable of selling tradable assets, of creating value, and 
of financing their investment by allocating their own resources.  
According to Alves and Francisco (2015) and regarding our sample, we expect that 
CAB has a positive impact on corporate leverage. However, the authors obtained 
inconclusive results. 
H9: CAB has a positive impact on leverage. 
Capital market development (CMD) and Banking development (BD) 
 Based on shareholder’ rights and creditors’ rights in order to study the role of the 
legal environment, La Porta et al. (1997,1998,1999) show that countries with poor 
investor protection, particularly civil law systems5, have significantly smaller debt and 
equity markers. Contrarily, countries with common law traditions6, strong shareholder 
protection, and good accounting regulations tend to be more market-based (Alves & 
Francisco 2015). 
Relatively to the empirical works related, Alves and Ferreira (2011) found that 
leverage is positively influenced by stock market development and negatively by banking 
development. Muradoğlu et al. (2014), in the same way, found that stock market 
development has a positive impact on leverage, however the relation between banking 
development and leverage was inconclusive. Finally, Alves and Francisco (2015) found 
inconclusive results in this variables. On the other hand, in empirical works it has been 
verified more often the positive impact of banking development on corporate short-term 
debt (Alves & Ferreira 2011; Alves & Francisco 2015). This is explained because it is 
cheaper to monitor short-term debt than long-term debt7. So, we expect that banking 
                                                 
5 In the sample of this dissertation the countries with civil law systems are France, Germany and 
Japan. 
6 The countries with common law traditions of our sample are United Kingdom and United States.  
7 Particularly when creditors are not well protected. 
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development has a negative impact on leverage but that this impact be less strong on 
short-term debt. 
Relatively to capital-market development, Alves and Ferreira (2011) identified a 
positive relation with long-term debt, and concluded that equity is replaced by long-term 
debt after stock market development. So, we expect that capital-market development has 
a positive impact on leverage, however this impact will be stronger on long-term debt. 
To analyse CMD and BD we will use this proxies: total values of shares traded 
during the period (% of GDP) to measure the capital market development (CMD) and 
domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) to measure the banking 
development (BD) (Alves & Ferreira 2011; Alves & Francisco 2015). 
Taking into account what was said above, we will test the followings hypotheses: 
H10: BD has a negative impact on leverage. 
H11: CMD has a positive impact on leverage. 
IV. Target Leverage and Speed of Adjusting 
The Trade-off theory suggest that firms have a target capital structure and managers 
adjust the ratios toward this target. The speed of adjustment depends on the cost of 
adjustment relative to the cost of being off target (Hovakimian et al. 2001). An analysis 
of the effect of one-period lagged leverage on the current leverage must show us  whether 
firms have a target capital structure and, if so, what the speed of adjustment (Antoniou et 
al. 2008; Acedo-Ramirez & Ruiz-Cabestre 2014; Öztekin 2015). A positive and below 
unity coefficient  suggest that firms have a target leverage ratio and revise their capital 
structure over time. A coefficient greater than one implies that firms do not have any 
target debt-equity ratio. 
Therefore, we will test  the following hypothesis: 
H12: Firms have a target of leverage ratio. 
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III. SAMPLE, VARIABLES AND METHODOLOGY 
I. The Sample 
The selection of sample countries is driven by the existence of different financial 
and institutional traditions across the five major economies of the world8. These selected 
countries can be categorized into two groups: (i) Market-based economies (U.S. and 
U.K.) and (ii) Bank-based economies (Japan, France and Germany). According to 
Antoniou et al. (2008), these two groups also coincide with the split between common 
law and code law countries, respectively. 
The choice of the sample period, from 2000 to 2015, is motivated by the availability 
of data and to have the same years before and after the subprime crisis, in order to make 
a reliable comparison. 
We used firms listed on the Euronext Liffe Paris, Deutsche Boerse AG, Tokyo, 
London, NASGAQ or NYSE. 
Thomson Reuters Datastream database was the main source of data. The initial 
sample covered 11,600 firms (825 French, 790 German, 2,922 Japanese, 1,857 U.K., and 
5,188 U.S).  
Following exclusion criteria from related studies, we excluded all companies with 
missing data for DS Mnemonic Code, all financial companies9 and, because we used 
dynamic models estimation that require at least five consecutive annual observation for 
the analysis be robust (Arellano & Bond 1991; Antoniou et al. 2008; Acedo-Ramirez & 
Ruiz-Cabestre 2014), all companies with less than five consecutive annual observations. 
                                                 
8 U.S., U.K., Japan, France and Germany 
9 Sic Code 60-67 
 14 
 
The final sample comprises 5,923 firms (443 French, 367 German, 2,155 Japanese, 
763 U.K., and 2,195 U.S.) with 94,769 firm-year observations 7,088 for France, 5,872 for 
Germany, 34,480 for Japan, 12,208 for the U.K., and 35,120 for the U.S.). 
The firm-level variables were obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream 
Database. Current account balance, capital market development, banking development 
and general government gross debt were obtained from World Bank. Finally, law are 
obtained from La Porta et al. (1998). 
II. Variables 
The dependent variables are defined as follows: book leverage (BKLEV) is total 
debt (WC 03255) divided by total assets (WC 02999); market leverage (MKTLEV) is 
total debt divided by the sum of total debt and market capitalization (WC 08001); long-
term debt to total debt (LTDT) is defined as long-term debt (WC 03251) divided by total 
debt; short-term debt to total debt (STDT) is defined as short-term debt (WC 03051) 
divided by total debt. 
We used two types of explanatory variables: firm-level variables and control 
variables. 
The firm-level variables are defined as follows: profitability (PROF) is defined as 
EBITDA (WC 18198) divided by total assets; growth opportunities (GWOP) is defined 
as total liabilities (WC 03351) plus market capitalization divided by total assets; 
tangibility (TANG) is defined as property, plant and equipment (WC 02501) divided by 
total assets; firm size (SIZE) is defined as the logarithm of sales (WC 01001); non debt 
tax shield (NDTS) is defined as depreciation and depletion (WC 04049) divided by total 
assets. 
Institutional variables are defined as follows: general government gross debt 
(GGGD) consists of all liabilities that require payment or payments of interest and/or 
principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the future (this includes debt 
liabilities in the form of Specially Drawing Rights (SDRs), currency and deposits, debt 
securities, loans, insurance, pensions and standardized guarantee schemes, and other 
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accounts payable); current account balance (CAB) includes all transactions other than 
those in financial and capital items; capital market development (CMD) is a proxy  for 
capital market development measured by the stocks traded during the period (% of GDP); 
banking development (BD) is a proxy for banking development measured by domestic 
credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) and law (LAW) is a variable dummy 
which assume the value 1 for common law countries and 0 for civil law countries. 
The last variable to be analyzed is a variable dummy, Dcrisis, which assumes the 
value 1 for the years 2008 to 2015 and 0 otherwise. 
III. Methodology  
According to Acedo-Ramirez and Ruiz-Cabestre (2014), Antoniou et al. (2008) and 
Öztekin (2015), instead of estimate a static model based on observed contemporaneous 
debt ratios, we estimate a dynamic panel model that produces an estimate of the 
unobserved target leverage and that can also provide an estimate of the adjustment speed 
to the target. So, the benefit of the partial adjustment model is that it incorporates 
rebalancing costs that may slow down the companies’ rate of adjustment to its optimal 
leverage. 
The target debt level of a firm i at time t (Levit*) may be explained by the variables 
explained before: 
 
where X represent  the vector of explanatory variables. 
Capital structure decisions are dynamic by nature and must be modeled as such. If 
there is a target of leverage, then companies should follow the most appropriate path to 
achieve that goal. However, the existence of transaction costs leads to companies not 
automatically adjusting their level of leverage to the target level, then: 
 
 
(
1) 
(
2) 
(1) Levit
*= β1+Σk=2βkXk,it+Ɛit 
(2) Levit
- Levit
*= α(Levit*- Levit-1), with 0<α<1 
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With Levit and  Levit-1 are the actual debt levels in the current and previous 
period respectively, while α measures the adjustment speed. The transaction costs 
are inversely relate to α and can be referred to as 1 – α. If the speed of adjustment is high 
(α = 1), companies automatically adjust their level of leverage to optimal: Levit= Levit*. 
If, on the other hand, the speed of adjustment is null (α = 0), companies prefer to do 
nothing: Levit= Levit-1. When the speed of adjustment is at the intermediate level (0 <α 
<1), companies adjust their level of leverage to the target in a direct manner as to 
adjustment speed (α). Equation 3 gives us the current level of leverage: 
Integrating equations 1 and 3, and taking into account that we are working with 
panel data, we obtain: 
 
 
 
where ηi is the firm-specific effect (to control for unobservable heterogeneity) and 
Ɛit is the white noise or random disturbance.   
We decide to include fixed effects after running the Hausman test. The Hausman 
test reject the null hypothesis that the random effects is adequate, so confirm that fixed 
effects should be included in the model. 
Finally, in order to analyse the choices of maturity between long term and short 
term, the following regression will also be estimated: 
 
where DMC is debt maturity choices (Long-term debt or short-term debt). 
The dynamic model with the pre-defined variables will be estimated using a two-
step system GMM procedure to avoid problems of unobserved heterogeneity and 
endogeneity (Antoniou et al. 2008; Acedo-Ramirez & Ruiz-Cabestre 2014; Öztekin 
2015). Unobserved heterogeneity refers to omitted variables that affect the outcome of 
(
3) 
(
4) 
(
5) 
(4) Levit= αβ1+(1-α)Levit-1+αΣk=2βkXk,it+ηi+Ɛit 
 
(3)   Levit= αLevit*+(1-α)Levit-1, com 0<α<1 
(5) DMCit= αβ1+(1-α)DMCit-1+αΣk=2βkXk,it+ηi+Ɛit 
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interest and are correlated with covariates. Thus, through the individual effect of firms, 
ηi, which is assumed to be different for every company and constant over time, this 
problem was taken into account. 
From the specification of the model, we can expected endogeneity problems to arise 
in the regressors due to:  
i. The time between taking the decision to change the capital structure and its 
execution; 
ii. And the lack of strict exogeneity of the explanatory variables. 
The GMM system solves the problem of endogeneity using instruments. More 
specifically using two types of instruments: 
i. Instruments in levels for equations in first differences; 
ii. And instruments in first differences for equations in levels. 
The model is estimated using the Eviews software. 
Foremost, we study descriptive statistics for firm-specific and control variables, 
analyse the matrix of correlation of variables, and then estimate the regressions for 
Leverage and DMC for the 5 countries together, for each one of the 5 countries separately 
and confronting capital market-oriented economies with bank-oriented economies.  
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IV. RESULTS 
I. Univariate results 
The table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables for each of the G5 
countries and for all the sample. We will analysed mean, median, standard deviation, 
maximum value, minimum value and the number of observations for dependent and 
independent variables from 2000 to 2015. 
As we can see in table 1, the banking economies have a larger mean market 
leverage than the capital market economies, like it was expected. For example, Japan has 
the larger value for the mean of market leverage with 31%, while the UK has the lowest 
value with 17%. It is possible to see that the minimum debt amount is zero so there are 
companies with no debt in their capital structure. 
An interesting result is that the mean of book leverage, other measure of leverage, 
show us that the country with the largest mean is US, with 23%, and the banking 
economies have the mean of book leverage more stable around 21%. This means that, in 
banking economies, the market finds the book value of assets undervalued. This is 
consistent with Alves and Ferreira (2011), Alves and Francisco (2015) and Antoniou et 
al. (2008). 
In relation to the structure of debt in relation to the maturity, in mean, all countries 
have used more long-term debt than sort-term debt, and the US was the country that have 
used more long-term debt, with 76% of total debt. 
Relatively to the firm-level variables, it is notorious that the mean of profitable is 
higher in banking economies (France and Germany with 0.09 and Japan with 0.08) than 
in market capital economies (UK with 0.01 and US with 0.03). Another relevant aspect 
is that the mean of growth opportunities is slightly lower in banking economies than in 
capital market economies. 
Finally, relatively to the control variables the mean of general government gross 
debt is very similar to the mean of current account balance. Only German and Japan have 
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the mean of this two variables positives. The  banking development and capital market 
development variables show higher volatility than the other variables. In average, the 
capital market development is lower in banking development than in capital market 
development, as Alves and Francisco (2015) defended. 
The table 2 shows Pearson’s correlations coefficients in order to understand the 
correlation between dependent and independent variables. The most relevant results are: 
(i) the Pearson correlation coefficient for market and book leverage is relatively small; 
(ii) profitable is negatively correlated with market and book leverage, but the coefficient 
is higher in absolute value for book leverage; (iii) growth opportunities are negatively 
correlated with market leverage but positively correlated with book leverage; (iv) size is 
positively correlated with both leverage measures, but the coefficient is higher for market 
leverage; (v) NDTS is positively correlated with both leverage measures, but the 
coefficient is higher for book leverage; (vi) all control variables have the correlation 
coefficient higher for market leverage than book leverage; (vii) the variable Dcrisis, 
which is related to post subprime crisis period is positively correlated with market 
leverage, but negatively correlated with book leverage and the correlation between this 
variable and long-term debt and short-term debt is consistent with the use of long-term 
debt rather than short-term debt in that period.
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
  
 MKTLEV BKLEV LTDT STDT PROF TANG GWOP SIZE NDTS GGGD CAB BD CMD 
France              
 Mean 0,28 0,22 0,56 0,42 0,09 0,18 1,46 12,03 0,04 -0,13 -0,14 127,50 61,44 
 Median 0,23 0,19 0,62 0,36 0,10 0,12 1,16 11,79 0,03 -0,25 -0,26 138,83 58,69 
 Max. 0,98 9,28 1,00 1,00 0,87 0,97 52,22 19,02 0,76 1,51 1,52 148,59 108,74 
 Min. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -1,61 0,00 0,07 2,83 -0,03 -1,22 -1,23 100,12 39,36 
 Std. Dev. 0,23 0,25 0,31 0,31 0,13 0,18 1,33 2,53 0,05 0,89 0,89 19,95 19,48 
 Skew. 0,75 13,79 -0,44 0,48 -2,32 1,57 13,59 0,32 5,27 0,50 0,51 -0,37 0,79 
 Kurtosis 2,78 401,53 2,04 2,13 22,81 5,49 383,93 2,73 45,64 1,85 1,86 1,28 2,86 
 Obs. 6189 6536 6517 6517 6536 6536 6536 6545 6536 7088 7088 7088 7088 
              
Germany              
 Mean 0,26 0,21 0,59 0,41 0,09 0,22 1,43 12,29 0,04 4,70 4,71 138,45 55,31 
 Median 0,20 0,18 0,68 0,32 0,11 0,19 1,18 12,02 0,03 5,65 5,68 136,98 43,34 
 Max. 0,99 1,88 1,00 1,00 0,89 0,92 11,45 19,18 0,78 8,45 8,32 164,80 111,65 
 Min. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -1,65 0,00 0,00 2,94 0,00 -1,75 -1,73 120,48 32,71 
 Std. Dev. 0,24 0,18 0,32 0,32 0,16 0,19 0,90 2,39 0,04 2,81 2,79 12,43 23,59 
 Skew. 0,83 1,09 -0,58 0,58 -2,70 1,07 3,68 0,30 5,51 -0,99 -1,01 0,81 1,22 
 Kurtosis 2,81 5,31 2,04 2,04 21,54 3,90 24,97 3,17 60,29 2,90 2,91 2,89 3,12 
 Obs. 5049 5313 4772 4772 5313 5313 5313 5293 5313 5872 5872 5872 5872 
              
Japan              
 Mean 0,31 0,21 0,44 0,56 0,08 0,30 1,17 12,91 0,03 2,73 2,73 314,76 84,76 
 Median 0,27 0,17 0,45 0,55 0,08 0,29 0,96 12,79 0,03 2,81 2,80 305,03 74,43 
 Max. 0,98 1,45 1,00 1,00 1,38 0,95 61,06 19,17 0,99 4,71 4,69 357,32 145,86 
 Min. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -1,82 0,00 0,00 3,93 0,00 0,79 0,74 285,17 39,55 
 Std. Dev. 0,26 0,18 0,27 0,27 0,08 0,18 1,18 1,65 0,03 1,11 1,11 23,25 32,92 
 Skew. 0,45 0,80 -0,04 0,04 -2,28 0,61 16,09 0,21 3,99 -0,31 -0,34 0,58 0,30 
 Kurtosis 2,03 3,10 2,06 2,06 48,75 3,24 513,78 3,52 82,41 2,29 2,29 1,92 1,77 
 Obs. 31967 32770 30130 30130 32770 32770 32770 32766 32770 34480 34480 34480 34480 
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Table 1: Summary statistics (Continued) 
BKLEV (book leverage) is total debt divided by total assets; MKTLEV (market leverage) is total debt divided by the sum of total debt and market capitalization; LTDT (long-term debt to total 
debt) is defined as long-term debt divided by total debt; STDT (short-term debt to total debt) is defined as short-term debt divided by total debt. PROF (profitability) is defined as EBITDA 
divided by total assets; GWOP (growth opportunities) is defined as total liabilities plus market capitalization divided by total assets; TANG (tangibility) is defined as property, plant and 
equipment divided by total assets; SIZE (firm size) is defined as the logarithm of sales; NDTS (non debt tax shield) is defined as depreciation and depletion divided by total assets. GGGD 
(general government gross debt (% of GDP)) consists of all liabilities that require payment or payments of interest and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the future 
(this includes debt liabilities in the form of SDRs, currency and deposits, debt securities, loans, insurance, pensions and standardized guarantee schemes, and other accounts payable); CAB 
(current account balance (% of GDP)) includes all transactions other than those in financial and capital items; CMD (capital market development) is a proxy  for capital market development 
measured by the stocks traded during the period (% of GDP); BD (banking development) is a proxy for banking development measured by domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of 
GDP). The sample includes companies for the G5 countries and the sample period is from 2000 to 2015. 
 MKTLEV BKLEV LTDT STDT PROF TANG GWOP SIZE NDTS GGGD CAB BD CMD 
UK              
 Mean 0,17 0,17 0,60 0,40 0,01 0,23 2,03 11,46 0,03 -2,78 -2,71 164,82 93,37 
 Median 0,11 0,12 0,72 0,28 0,09 0,14 1,38 11,53 0,02 -2,34 -2,35 165,36 94,25 
 Max. 0,98 7,07 1,00 1,00 4,79 1,00 99,19 19,71 0,79 -1,21 -1,20 210,28 132,25 
 Min. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -11,22 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -5,35 -4,66 117,56 59,60 
 Std. Dev. 0,19 0,23 0,36 0,36 0,40 0,24 2,90 2,90 0,03 1,17 1,05 29,81 24,77 
 Skew. 1,36 7,36 -0,58 0,58 -8,79 1,18 11,13 -0,35 5,11 -0,78 -0,55 -0,02 0,05 
 Kurtosis 4,53 159,77 1,85 1,85 154,66 3,55 218,97 3,34 73,09 2,47 2,00 1,68 1,54 
 Obs. 9990 10494 8112 8112 10494 10494 10494 9693 10494 12208 12208 12208 12208 
              
US              
 Mean 0,20 0,23 0,76 0,24 0,03 0,27 2,23 12,86 0,04 -3,82 -3,82 222,59 222,97 
 Median 0,13 0,19 0,90 0,10 0,11 0,19 1,52 13,07 0,03 -3,86 -3,86 228,44 222,40 
 Max. 1,00 12,54 1,00 1,00 25,04 2,55 224,96 19,92 0,99 -2,20 -2,20 251,00 320,99 
 Min. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -99,60 0,00 -1,38 0,00 0,00 -5,82 -5,82 190,96 139,39 
 Std. Dev. 0,22 0,31 0,31 0,31 0,80 0,24 3,78 2,42 0,03 1,19 1,19 17,98 50,15 
 Skew. 1,23 9,52 -1,44 1,44 -65,00 1,06 24,83 -0,62 4,80 -0,21 -0,20 -0,35 0,22 
 Kurtosis 3,95 238,92 3,78 3,78 7615,89 3,30 1014,16 4,04 68,53 1,68 1,68 2,07 2,33 
 Obs. 30436 31929 26324 26324 31929 31929 31929 31351 31929 35120 35120 35120 35120 
              
Total              
 Mean 0,25 0,21 0,59 0,41 0,05 0,27 1,70 12,62 0,03 -0,50 -0,49 236,36 133,52 
 Median 0,18 0,17 0,64 0,35 0,09 0,22 1,17 12,69 0,03 -1,21 -1,20 233,43 117,99 
 Max. 1,00 12,54 1,00 1,00 25,04 2,55 224,96 19,92 0,99 8,45 8,32 357,32 320,99 
 Min. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -99,60 0,00 -1,38 0,00 -0,03 -5,82 -5,82 100,12 32,71 
 Std. Dev. 0,24 0,25 0,33 0,33 0,51 0,22 2,68 2,28 0,03 3,45 3,44 70,12 79,21 
 Skew. 0,85 8,76 -0,42 0,43 -92,35 0,96 28,28 -0,46 5,44 0,23 0,24 -0,06 0,69 
 Kurtosis 2,76 259,61 1,90 1,90 16851,13 3,45 1533,73 4,17 77,39 1,88 1,88 2,00 2,35 
 Obs. 83631 87042 75855 75855 87042 87042 87042 85648 87042 94768 94768 94768 94768 
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Table 2: Pearson’s Correlation 
 MKTLEV BKLEV LTDT STDT PROF TANG GWOP SIZE NDTS GGGD CAB BD CMD DCRISIS 
 
              
MKTLEV 1,000              
BKLEV 0,623 1,000             
LTDT 0,065 0,222 1,000            
STDT -0,059 -0,217 -0,992 1,000           
PROF -0,035 -0,225 0,072 -0,073 1,000          
TANG 0,321 0,249 0,200 -0,196 0,077 1,000         
GWOP -0,234 0,149 0,035 -0,039 -0,425 -0,112 1,000        
SIZE 0,146 0,055 0,241 -0,235 0,254 0,142 -0,137 1,000       
NDTS 0,062 0,116 0,090 -0,088 -0,043 0,334 0,027 0,006 1,000      
GGGD 0,157 -0,066 -0,348 0,349 0,031 0,018 -0,162 -0,007 -0,044 1,000     
CAB 0,157 -0,067 -0,349 0,350 0,030 0,017 -0,163 -0,008 -0,044 1,000 1,000    
BD 0,131 -0,018 -0,214 0,221 0,002 0,138 -0,117 0,122 -0,083 0,372 0,370 1,000   
CMD -0,129 0,084 0,330 -0,326 -0,028 0,036 0,142 0,092 0,022 -0,653 -0,657 -0,061 1,000  
DCRISIS 0,011 -0,015 0,064 -0,065 -0,018 -0,032 -0,048 0,012 -0,017 0,002 0,004 0,207 0,093 1,000 
BKLEV (book leverage) is total debt divided by total assets; MKTLEV (market leverage) is total debt divided by the sum of total debt and market capitalization; LTDT 
(long-term debt to total debt) is defined as long-term debt divided by total debt; STDT (short-term debt to total debt) is defined as short-term debt divided by total 
debt. PROF (profitability) is defined as EBITDA divided by total assets; GWOP (growth opportunities) is defined as total liabilities plus market capitalization divided 
by total assets; TANG (tangibility) is defined as property, plant and equipment divided by total assets; SIZE (firm size) is defined as the logarithm of sales; NDTS (non 
debt tax shield) is defined as depreciation and depletion divided by total assets. GGGD (general government gross debt (% of GDP)) consists of all liabilities that 
require payment or payments of interest and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the future (this includes debt liabilities in the form of SDRs, 
currency and deposits, debt securities, loans, insurance, pensions and standardized guarantee schemes, and other accounts payable); CAB (current account balance 
(% of GDP)) includes all transactions other than those in financial and capital items; CMD (capital market development) is a proxy  for capital market development 
measured by the stocks traded during the period (% of GDP); BD (banking development) is a proxy for banking development measured by domestic credit provided by 
financial sector (% of GDP).  Dcrisis is a variable dummy which assumes the value 1 for the years 2008 to 2015 and 0 otherwise. The sample includes companies for 
the G5 countries and the sample period is from 2000 to 2015.
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II. Multivariate analysis 
Full Sample 
The results present in table 3 show how (i) leverage (market leverage and book 
leverage) and debt maturity choices (LTDT and STDT) react to the firm-level variables 
and the control variables and the impact of subprime crisis in that relation, and how (ii) 
the variables resulting from de interaction between the period after subprime crisis and 
firm-level variables and control variables influence the dependent variables. To explain 
the two dependencies we estimate eight models. 
Relatively to the impact of the subprime crisis on leverage (H1), the models (1), (2) 
and (4) of table 3 confirm a positive and significant coefficient (4.1%, 2.2% and 2.7%, 
respectively) like Alves and Ferreira (2011) and Alves and Francisco (2015). These 
results provide strong support for H1. 
In relation to the debt maturity choices, the model (6) and (8) of table 3 show us 
that after subprime crisis the companies use more short debt than long term debt as Alves 
and Francisco (2015). The coefficient of model (6) is negative and significant with the 
value of -5.7% and the coefficient of model (8) is positive and significant with the value 
of 8.7%. So these results confirm H2. 
Regarding to the firm-level variables, profitability, growth opportunities and 
NDTS, are all negatively correlated with market leverage, less the tangibility and size that 
are positively correlated (models (1) and (2) of table 3). This provides support for H3, 
H4, H5, H6 e H7. This means that companies more profitable, with more growth 
opportunities and utilizing more NDTS use more equity than debt. On otherwise, 
companies with more tangible assets and more dimension use more debt than equity. 
However, in model (2) after the subprime crisis the tangibility and size gained importance 
in market leverage and NDTS has the contrary impact on market leverage. Alves and 
Francisco (2015) also obtain the same results. A possible reason for this have happened 
is the mandatory adoption of the IFRS for the European countries in 2005. Prior to the 
adoption of IFRS, each company had its own accounting policy in relation to 
depreciation and after the adoption of IFRS the financial reporting convergence 
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increased.The results for book leverage are relatively similar to the market leverage 
results. However, the coefficient of profitability is bigger in absolute value and the growth 
opportunities and NDTS have a positive impact on book leverage, which don’t support 
H5 and H7. After the subprime crisis, the impact of profitability, tangibility, growth 
opportunities and size are smaller on book leverage. 
Finally, the tangibility and size have a positive impact on long-term debt and NDTS 
has a negative impact. For the short-term debt, this firm-level variables have the opposite 
signals. 
The control variables present somewhat controversial results. For model (1) of table 3 the 
GGGD is positively correlated with leverage, giving support to H8. However, for model 
(2) and (4) is negatively correlated, which don’t give support to H8. The variable CAB, 
in models (2) and (4) is positively correlated with leverage, supporting H9. But, in model 
(1) the impact of this variable on leverage is negative, don’t supporting H9. Finally, after 
the subprime crisis, the impact on leverage of GGGD is higher and positive and the impact 
on leverage of CAB is higher, but negative. 
For the other two controls variables, the impact of BD on leverage is negative but 
very close to zero and after the subprime crisis still negative, which support H10. In 
relation to the impact of CMD on market leverage is positive but very close to zero and 
after the subprime crisis stills positive, supporting H11. However, for book leverage the 
impact of CMD is negative, don’t supporting H11.  Alves and Francisco (2015) also 
obtained mix results in their research. 
According to the trade-off theory, all models show us that exist a target of leverage 
supporting H12. The speed of adjustment, for model (1) is 38.2%, for model (2) is 37.6%, 
for model (3) is 54.1% and for model (4) is 56.1%. These results are consistent with 
Antoniou et al. (2008) work. After the subprime crisis the speed of adjusting decreases 
for market leverage, LTDT and STD, and increases for book leverage variable.   
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Table 3: Panel Data regressions: Total sample 
Variables 
Market Leverage Book Leverage LTDT STDT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
LEVERAGE(-1) 0,618*** 0,624*** 0,459*** 0,439*** 0,382*** 0,404*** 0,377*** 0,401*** 
 220,262 181,709 155,439 116,600 102,861 80,708 101,570 79,830 
PROF -0,054*** -0,051*** -0,131*** -0,171*** 0,008 0,001 -0,010*** -0,003 
 -37,101 -21,466 -69,469 -55,744 2,044 0,216 -2,681 -0,532 
TANG 0,148*** 0,137*** 0,136*** 0,165*** 0,116*** 0,122*** -0,119*** -0,125*** 
 26,412 22,486 19,267 21,367 9,341 9,059 -9,516 -9,247 
GWOP -0,008*** -0,008*** 0,001*** 0,005*** 0,000 -0,001* -0,001 0,001 
 -34,916 -22,475 4,492 12,598 -0,490 -1,655 -1,059 0,937 
SIZE 0,016*** 0,015*** 0,010*** 0,012*** 0,011*** 0,009*** -0,011*** -0,009*** 
 23,259 20,254 11,368 13,859 6,735 5,090 -6,505 -4,894 
NDTS -0,032* -0,113*** 0,114*** 0,014 -0,176*** -0,159*** 0,190*** 0,164*** 
 -1,903 -5,246 5,211 0,490 -4,655 -3,280 4,991 3,375 
GGGD 0,032*** -0,889*** -0,004 -0,281*** -0,023*** 0,295*** 0,023*** -0,278*** 
 8,972 -18,251 -0,900 -4,422 -2,638 2,795 2,599 -2,626 
CAB -0,042*** 0,877*** 0,005 0,280*** 0,025*** -0,291*** -0,025*** 0,274*** 
 -11,506 17,987 0,949 4,409 2,870 -2,758 -2,814 2,590 
BD -0,001*** -0,001*** -0,000*** -0,000 0,001*** 0,001*** -0,001*** -0,001*** 
 -46,285 -33,682 -4,070 -0,961 10,399 7,991 -10,367 -8,093 
CMD 0,000*** 0,000*** -0,000** -0,000*** -0,000*** -0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000** 
 19,360 12,183 -2,017 -4,430 -4,026 -2,609 4,247 2,561 
DCRISIS 0,041*** 0,022*** 0,002 0,027*** 0,003 -0,057*** -0,004* 0,087*** 
 39,238 4,237 1,497 4,056 1,183 -4,716 -1,666 6,760 
LEVERAGE(-1)*DCRISIS  -0,023***  0,035***  -0,042***  -0,043*** 
  -6,608  8,194  -6,973  -7,118 
PROF*DCRISIS  -0,002  0,054***  0,011  -0,013* 
  -0,868  15,151  1,575  -1,825 
TANG*DCRISIS  0,014***  -0,050***  -0,005  0,005 
  3,663  -9,960  -0,567  0,629 
GWOP*DCRISIS  0,001  -0,005***  0,002*  -0,002** 
  1,289  -11,011  1,813  -2,328 
SIZE*DCRISIS  0,002***  -0,002***  0,006***  -0,006*** 
  6,268  -4,057  7,290  -6,675 
NDTS*DCRISIS  0,162***  0,175***  -0,041  0,051 
  6,650  5,553  -0,762  0,944 
GGGD*DCRISIS  0,923***  0,277***  -0,321***  0,303*** 
  18,883  4,354  -3,029  2,848 
CAB*DCRISIS  -0,918***  -0,277***  0,320***  -0,301*** 
  -18,811  -4,351  3,019  -2,837 
BD*DCRISIS  -0,000***  -0,000***  0,000*  -0,000 
  -12,345  -3,576  1,821  -1,262 
CMD*DCRISIS  0,000***  0,000***  -0,000  0,000 
  10,177  5,537  -1,338  1,573 
CONSTANT 0,103*** 0,084*** -0,008 -0,062*** 0,051** 0,084*** 0,565*** 0,512*** 
 10,096 7,609 -0,614 -4,537 2,073 3,220 22,789 19,436 
         
Observations 76 471 76 471 79 779 79 779 68 374 68 374 68 374 68 374 
Number of firms 5 873 5 873 5 876 5 876 5 663 5 663 5 663 5 663 
R-squared 0,862 0,864 0,736 0,738 0,674 0,674 0,671 0,672 
  
The dependent variable are: BKLEV (book leverage) is total debt divided by total assets; MKTLEV (market leverage) is total debt divided by the sum of 
total debt and market capitalization; LTDT (long-term debt to total debt) is defined as long-term debt divided by total debt; STDT (short-term debt to total 
debt) is defined as short-term debt divided by total debt. The explanatory variables are: PROF (profitability) is defined as EBITDA divided by total assets; 
GWOP (growth opportunities) is defined as total liabilities plus market capitalization divided by total assets; TANG (tangibility) is defined as property, 
plant and equipment divided by total assets; SIZE (firm size) is defined as the logarithm of sales; NDTS (non debt tax shield) is defined as depreciation and 
depletion divided by total assets; GGGD (general government gross debt (% of GDP)) consists of all liabilities that require payment or payments of interest 
and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the future (this includes debt liabilities in the form of SDRs, currency and deposits, debt 
securities, loans, insurance, pensions and standardized guarantee schemes, and other accounts payable); CAB (current account balance (% of GDP)) 
includes all transactions other than those in financial and capital items; CMD (capital market development) is a proxy  for capital market development 
measured by the stocks traded during the period (% of GDP); BD (banking development) is a proxy for banking development measured by domestic credit 
provided by financial sector (% of GDP); Dcrisis is a variable dummy which assumes the value 1 for the years 2008 to 2015 and 0 otherwise. We use a two-
step system GMM procedure, panel data during the period: 2000 to 2015and the sample includes firms from the G5 countries.  Coefficient values are listed 
at the first row at bold and t-statistics are in second row. The symbol * means that the variables is significant at 10% level, ** means that the variable is 
significant at 5% level, and *** means that the variable is significant at the 1% level.   
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Individual Samples: France, Germany, Japan, UK and US 
In table 4, we estimate the eight same models in table 3 but for each country 
individually. The results are very similar of table 3. 
The most relevant results are: (i) the subprime crisis doesn’t have impact on 
leverage of firms in German and for the UK, only in model (8) has a significant impact; 
(ii) the subprime crisis has a negative impact on leverage of firms in France in model (4) 
and for firms in Japan in model (2) and (3); (iii) only for US (model (6) and (8)) the firms 
after subprime crisis used more short-term than long-term debt; (iv) profitability, 
tangibility, and size have the expected signals, however NDTS is not significant in 
German and UK and the signal of the coefficient changes across countries. For growth 
opportunities, the signal of the coefficient changes across the models (1) to (4) for France, 
UK and US; (v) after the subprime crisis, for model (4) in Japan and US the impact of 
tangibility is lower, the impact of profitability for model (4) in US is higher and the impact 
of size is lower for that country. In this period the impact of NDTS in France, Japan and 
US is positive and strong; (vi) according to the trade-off theory, all countries have a target 
of leverage. 
Banking Development vs Capital Market Development 
For table 5 we estimate the same eight models from table 3 and 4, but we divided 
the sample in banking development countries10 and capital market development 
countries11. 
As we can see in table 5, the period after the subprime crisis has a positive impact 
on market leverage for both economies and for CMD economies after the subprime crisis 
the companies use more long-term debt than short-term debt. For BD economies this 
variable isn’t significant. 
                                                 
10 France, Germany and Japan. 
11 UK and US. 
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For firm level variables, the profitability, tangibility and size have the signals 
expected, however the coefficient is higher in absolute value for BD economies. For 
growth opportunities and NDTS the coefficient is negative for market leverage and 
positive for book leverage, such as in the table 3 and 4. However, in the BD economies, 
the coefficient for growth opportunities is higher in absolute value, contradicting 
Antoniou et al. (2008). Relatively to the debt maturity choices, tangibility and size have 
a positive (negative) impact on LTDT (STDT) and NDTS has a negative (positive) impact 
on LTDT (STDT). 
In relation to the control variables, GGGD has a negative signal when BD 
economies are considered and a positive signal for CMD. This means that in BD (CMD) 
economies when the governments are more indebted companies tend to use less (more) 
debt. The CAB has exactly the opposite results in comparison to GGGD results. This 
means that when BD (CMD) economies are more competitive the companies use more 
(less) debt. 
Finally, all models show that exist a target of leverage, confirming one more time 
the trade-off theory.
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Table 4: Panel Data regressions: Individual sample 
France 
 
 
 
Variables 
Market Leverage Book Leverage LTDT STDT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
LEVERAGE 0,550*** 0,546*** 0,343*** 0,283*** 0,380*** 0,388*** 0,344*** 0,359*** 
 51,317 38,912 33,115 18,647 31,331 23,212 28,075 21,260 
PROF -0,235*** -0,222*** -0,272*** -0,240*** -0,020 -0,041 -0,040 -0,003 
 -14,808 -11,273 -12,715 -9,581 -0,639 -1,083 -1,233 -0,076 
TANG 0,150*** 0,155*** 0,140*** 0,186*** 0,102** 0,103* -0,117** -0,113** 
 6,277 5,849 4,216 5,140 2,093 1,895 -2,326 -2,041 
GWOP -0,025*** -0,026*** 0,047*** 0,015*** 0,005 0,009* -0,013*** -0,022*** 
 -11,882 -9,057 16,956 4,383 1,233 1,785 -3,087 -4,181 
SIZE 0,016*** 0,016*** -0,008* -0,006 0,035*** 0,036*** -0,031*** -0,033*** 
 5,130 4,887 -1,883 -1,397 5,815 5,838 -4,979 -5,290 
NDTS 0,005 -0,071 -0,175*** -0,193*** 0,076 0,067 -0,081 -0,121 
 0,161 -1,597 -3,591 -3,136 1,062 0,716 -1,102 -1,267 
DCRISIS 0,009*** -0,006 0,012*** -0,084*** 0,010 0,057* -0,023*** -0,115*** 
 2,893 -0,359 2,840 -3,883 1,595 1,707 -3,517 -3,142 
LEVERAGE*DCRISIS  0,004  0,056***  -0,012  -0,027 
  0,314  3,242  -0,565  -1,271 
PROF*DCRISIS  -0,026  -0,079**  0,046  -0,080 
  -1,089  -2,454  0,951  -1,607 
TANG*DCRISIS  -0,004  -0,034  -0,010  0,019 
  -0,229  -1,485  -0,291  0,538 
GWOP*DCRISIS  0,001  0,066***  -0,008  0,017*** 
  0,248  15,141  -1,235  2,610 
SIZE*DCRISIS  0,001  0,000  -0,003  0,007** 
  0,566  0,103  -1,049  2,571 
NDTS*DCRISIS  0,147***  0,048  0,021  0,071 
  2,640  0,625  0,185  0,600 
CONSTANT -0,039 -0,035 0,166*** 0,193*** -0,106 -0,126* 0,704*** 0,742 
 -1,030 -0,889 3,419 3,975 -1,466 -1,698 9,408 9,680 
         
Observations 5 683 5 683 6 034 6 034 6 006 6 006 6 006 6 006 
Number of firms 443 443 443 443 443 443 443 443 
R-squared 0,836 0,836 0,642 0,658 0,542 0,543 0,504 0,506 
         
Adjusted R-squared 0,822 0,822 0,613 0,630 0,505 0,505 0,464 0,465 
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Table 4: Panel Data regressions: Individual sample (Continued) 
Germany 
Variables 
Market Leverage Book Leverage LTDT STDT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
LEVERAGE 0,548*** 0,556*** 0,577*** 0,580*** 0,393*** 0,425*** 0,393*** 0,425*** 
 48,255 40,160 52,513 43,303 27,084 21,001 27,084 21,001 
PROF -0,198*** -0,156*** -0,176*** -0,140*** 0,071** 0,017 -0,071** -0,017 
 -15,362 -8,721 -18,051 -10,744 2,299 0,405 -2,299 -0,405 
TANG 0,198*** 0,199*** 0,222*** 0,223*** 0,217*** 0,193*** -0,217*** -0,193*** 
 8,644 7,711 13,156 11,777 4,376 3,479 -4,376 -3,479 
GWOP -0,047*** -0,049*** -0,009*** -0,012*** 0,003 0,008 -0,003 -0,008 
 -16,881 -13,463 -4,368 -4,895 0,538 1,002 -0,538 -1,002 
SIZE 0,020*** 0,020*** 0,009*** 0,010*** -0,003 -0,009 0,003 0,009 
 6,019 5,845 3,931 3,869 -0,392 -1,133 0,392 1,133 
NDTS -0,024 -0,011 0,047 0,054 -0,144 0,049 0,144 -0,049 
 -0,510 -0,167 1,303 1,098 -1,413 0,349 1,413 -0,349 
DCRISIS -0,005 0,002 -0,001 -0,013 0,025*** -0,029 -0,025*** 0,087* 
 -1,587 0,120 -0,552 -0,965 3,273 -0,649 -3,273 1,859 
LEVERAGE*DCRISIS  -0,020  -0,008  -0,058**  -0,058** 
  -1,231  -0,513  -2,350  -2,350 
PROF*DCRISIS  -0,080***  -0,071***  0,097*  -0,097* 
  -3,554  -4,264  1,799  -1,799 
TANG*DCRISIS  -0,008  -0,001  0,044  -0,044 
  -0,387  -0,072  1,024  -1,024 
GWOP*DCRISIS  0,002  0,006*  -0,006  0,006 
  0,482  1,892  -0,612  0,612 
SIZE*DCRISIS  0,000  0,001  0,007**  -0,007** 
  0,278  1,016  2,188  -2,188 
NDTS*DCRISIS  -0,043  -0,031  -0,326*  0,326* 
  -0,528  -0,501  -1,837  1,837 
CONSTANT -0,081** -0,090** -0,050* -0,051* 0,333*** 0,394*** 0,273*** 0,182* 
 -1,992 -2,109 -1,723 -1,712 3,302 3,732 2,689 1,709 
         
Observations 4 655 4 655 4 921 4 921 4 320 4 320 4 320 4 320 
Number of firms 367 367 367 367 357 357 357 357 
R-squared 0,834 0,834 0,820 0,821 0,553 0,556 0,553 0,556 
Adjusted R-squared 0,819 0,820 0,805 0,806 0,512 0,514 0,512 0,514 
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Table 4: Panel Data regressions: Individual sample (continued) 
Japan 
Variables 
Market Leverage Book Leverage LTDT STDT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
LEVERAGE 0,652*** 0,664*** 0,686*** 0,693*** 0,418*** 0,448*** 0,418*** 0,448*** 
 164,125 146,307 190,400 178,554 73,273 58,268 73,273 58,268 
PROF -0,390*** -0,367*** -0,291*** -0,299*** -0,012 -0,016 0,012 0,016 
 -47,510 -31,055 -63,055 -45,906 -0,655 -0,646 0,655 0,646 
TANG 0,220*** 0,212*** 0,133*** 0,147*** 0,125*** 0,132*** -0,125*** -0,132*** 
 22,248 19,684 22,664 23,083 5,807 5,629 -5,807 -5,629 
GWOP -0,010*** -0,007*** 0,000 0,000 -0,001 -0,001 0,001 0,001 
 -13,854 -8,455 -1,335 0,899 -0,439 -0,248 0,439 0,248 
SIZE 0,025*** 0,025*** 0,017*** 0,016*** 0,014*** 0,013*** -0,014*** -0,013*** 
 14,035 13,208 17,604 15,280 3,785 3,204 -3,785 -3,204 
NDTS 0,306*** 0,201*** 0,229*** 0,140*** -0,292*** -0,197 0,292*** 0,197 
 8,149 3,823 10,472 4,626 -3,354 -1,626 3,354 1,626 
DCRISIS 0,006*** -0,020** -0,003*** -0,006 0,026*** -0,025 -0,026*** 0,080*** 
 5,944 -2,340 -5,376 -1,241 11,862 -1,346 -11,862 3,763 
LEVERAGE*DCRISIS  -0,026***  -0,022***  -0,055***  -0,055*** 
  -5,828  -5,949  -6,033  -6,033 
PROF*DCRISIS  -0,025*  0,019**  0,002  -0,002 
  -1,745  2,383  0,076  -0,076 
TANG*DCRISIS  0,020***  -0,016***  -0,010  0,010 
  3,049  -3,969  -0,716  0,716 
GWOP*DCRISIS  -0,017***  -0,003***  -0,001  0,001 
  -13,274  -3,791  -0,324  0,324 
SIZE*DCRISIS  0,003***  0,001**  0,006***  -0,006*** 
  5,171  2,064  4,582  -4,582 
NDTS*DCRISIS  0,138***  0,127***  -0,120  0,120 
  2,814  4,473  -1,087  1,087 
CONSTANT -0,263*** -0,269*** -0,181 -0,168*** 0,024 0,025 0,558*** 0,527*** 
 -11,252 -10,732 -14,540 -12,654 0,489 0,470 11,177 9,918 
         
Observations 29 789 29 789 30 602 30 602 27 684 27 684 27 684 27 684 
Number of firms 2 155 2 155 2 155 2 155 2 105 2 105 2 105 2 105 
R-squared 0,910 0,910 0,932 0,932 0,627 0,628 0,627 0,628 
Adjusted R-squared 0,902 0,903 0,927 0,927 0,597 0,598 0,597 0,598 
 
 
  
Table 4: Panel Data regressions: Individual sample (continued) 
UK 
Variables 
Market Leverage Book Leverage LTDT STDT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
LEVERAGE 0,544*** 0,551*** 0,448*** 0,522*** 0,362*** 0,402*** 0,362*** 0,402*** 
 59,081 38,605 47,481 37,872 30,952 24,478 30,952 24,478 
PROF -0,039*** -0,029*** -0,043*** -0,034*** 0,006 0,005 -0,006 -0,005 
 -8,529 -4,462 -7,798 -4,384 0,422 0,244 -0,422 -0,244 
TANG 0,107*** 0,098*** 0,112*** 0,089*** 0,143*** 0,138*** -0,143*** -0,138*** 
 7,416 5,975 6,571 4,643 3,745 3,309 -3,745 -3,309 
GWOP -0,007*** -0,005*** 0,004*** 0,002* -0,002 -0,002 0,002 0,002 
 -10,980 -6,700 5,256 1,874 -1,066 -0,945 1,066 0,945 
SIZE 0,011*** 0,011*** 0,009*** 0,007*** 0,013** 0,008 -0,013** -0,008 
 6,576 6,013 4,734 3,378 2,540 1,563 -2,540 -1,563 
NDTS 0,091 -0,019 0,008 0,032 -0,473*** -0,584*** 0,473*** 0,584*** 
 1,580 -0,229 0,123 0,322 -3,245 -2,880 3,245 2,880 
DCRISIS 0,011*** -0,006 -0,002 -0,024* 0,024*** -0,056* -0,024*** 0,129*** 
 4,158 -0,526 -0,520 -1,692 3,606 -1,668 -3,606 3,363 
LEVERAGE*DCRISIS  -0,013  -0,119***  -0,073***  -0,073 
  -0,868  -7,705  -3,652  -3,652 
PROF*DCRISIS  -0,021**  -0,020**  0,001  -0,001 
  -2,500  -2,040  0,033  -0,033 
TANG*DCRISIS  0,025**  0,042***  0,030  -0,030 
  2,017  2,909  1,036  -1,036 
GWOP*DCRISIS  -0,008***  0,008***  -0,002  0,002 
  -6,247  5,353  -0,340  0,340 
SIZE*DCRISIS  0,002**  0,002  0,009***  -0,009*** 
  2,072  1,593  3,338  -3,338 
NDTS*DCRISIS  0,130  -0,051  0,170  -0,170 
  1,467  -0,481  0,791  -0,791 
CONSTANT -0,062*** -0,057*** -0,038* -0,016 0,201*** 0,242*** 0,438*** 0,356*** 
 -3,247 -2,831 -1,763 -0,696 3,241 3,777 7,009 5,453 
         
Observations 8 585 8 585 9 022 9 022 7 027 7 027 7 027 7 027 
Number of firms 728 728 730 730 673 673 673 673 
R-squared 0,742 0,744 0,679 0,682 0,588 0,590 0,588 0,590 
Adjusted R-squared 0,718 0,720 0,650 0,654 0,544 0,545 0,544 0,545 
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Table 4: Panel Data regressions: Individual sample (continued) 
US 
Variables 
Market Leverage Book Leverage LTDT STDT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
LEVERAGE 0,558*** 0,576*** 0,432*** 0,375*** 0,357*** 0,363*** 0,357*** 0,363*** 
 112,927 91,357 87,083 58,953 54,614 41,286 54,586 41,282 
PROF -0,042*** -0,041*** -0,136*** -0,192*** 0,006 0,001 -0,008* -0,002 
 -23,860 -13,277 -47,016 -38,719 1,347 0,193 -1,727 -0,322 
TANG 0,138*** 0,126*** 0,073*** 0,135*** 0,097*** 0,103*** -0,098*** -0,104*** 
 14,977 12,406 5,034 8,545 4,840 4,729 -4,896 -4,753 
GWOP -0,006*** -0,008*** 0,001 0,010*** 0,000 -0,002* -0,001 0,002 
 -24,191 -16,014 1,487 12,804 0,342 -1,702 -1,520 1,548 
SIZE 0,011*** 0,009*** 0,009*** 0,015*** 0,014*** 0,010*** -0,014*** -0,010*** 
 10,595 8,114 5,688 9,431 5,732 3,990 -5,748 -3,933 
NDTS -0,159*** -0,198*** 0,491*** 0,247*** -0,499*** -0,519*** 0,498*** 0,514*** 
 -4,800 -5,156 8,983 3,937 -6,189 -5,487 6,174 5,439 
DCRISIS 0,011*** -0,019** 0,006*** 0,063*** 0,009*** -0,105*** -0,010*** 0,120*** 
 8,717 -2,382 2,858 4,972 3,171 -5,360 -3,235 5,848 
LEVERAGE*DCRISIS  -0,032***  0,104***  -0,014  -0,014 
  -4,768  13,666  -1,289  -1,319 
PROF*DCRISIS  0,000  0,071***  0,011  -0,013 
  -0,024  12,595  1,199  -1,468 
TANG*DCRISIS  0,021***  -0,097***  -0,013  0,012 
  3,202  -9,487  -0,967  0,896 
GWOP*DCRISIS  0,002***  -0,012***  0,003**  -0,004*** 
  4,187  -13,515  2,403  -3,108 
SIZE*DCRISIS  0,002***  -0,004***  0,009***  -0,009*** 
  2,912  -4,059  6,353  -6,321 
NDTS*DCRISIS  0,095**  0,388***  0,043  -0,040 
  2,117  5,274  0,422  -0,396 
Constante -0,069*** -0,039*** -0,019 -0,113*** 0,297*** 0,348*** 0,349*** 0,288*** 
 -5,360 -2,784 -0,954 -5,350 9,304 10,368 10,934 8,606 
         
Observations 27 759 27 759 29 200 29 200 23 337 23 337 23 337 23 337 
Number of firms 2 180 2 180 2 181 2 181 2 085 2 085 2 085 2 085 
R-squared 0,814 0,814 0,685 0,692 0,590 0,591 0,590 0,591 
Adjusted R-squared 0,798 0,798 0,659 0,667 0,550 0,551 0,549 0,550 
 
  
The dependent variable are: BKLEV (book leverage) is total debt divided by total assets; MKTLEV (market leverage) is total debt divided by the sum of 
total debt and market capitalization; LTDT (long-term debt to total debt) is defined as long-term debt divided by total debt; STDT (short-term debt to 
total debt) is defined as short-term debt divided by total debt. The explanatory variables are: PROF (profitability) is defined as EBITDA divided by 
total assets; GWOP (growth opportunities) is defined as total liabilities plus market capitalization divided by total assets; TANG (tangibility) is defined 
as property, plant and equipment divided by total assets; SIZE (firm size) is defined as the logarithm of sales; NDTS (non debt tax shield) is defined as 
depreciation and depletion divided by total assets; Dcrisis is a variable dummy which assumes the value 1 for the years 2008 to 2015 and 0 otherwise. 
We use a two-step system GMM procedure, panel data during the period: 2000 to 2015 and the sample includes firms from the G5 countries.  
Coefficient values are listed at the first row at bold and t-statistics are in second row. The symbol * means that the variables is significant at 10% level, 
** means that the variable is significant at 5% level, and *** means that the variable is significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5: Panel Data regressions: BD vs CMD 
 
 
The dependent variable are: BKLEV (book leverage) is total debt divided by total assets; MKTLEV (market leverage) is total debt divided by the sum of 
total debt and market capitalization; LTDT (long-term debt to total debt) is defined as long-term debt divided by total debt; STDT (short-term debt to 
total debt) is defined as short-term debt divided by total debt. The explanatory variables are: PROF (profitability) is defined as EBITDA divided by 
total assets; GWOP (growth opportunities) is defined as total liabilities plus market capitalization divided by total assets; TANG (tangibility) is defined 
as property, plant and equipment divided by total assets; SIZE (firm size) is defined as the logarithm of sales; NDTS (non debt tax shield) is defined as 
depreciation and depletion divided by total assets; GGGD (general government gross debt (% of GDP)) consists of all liabilities that require payment 
or payments of interest and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the future (this includes debt liabilities in the form of SDRs, 
currency and deposits, debt securities, loans, insurance, pensions and standardized guarantee schemes, and other accounts payable); CAB (current 
account balance (% of GDP)) includes all transactions other than those in financial and capital items; Dcrisis is a variable dummy which assumes the 
value 1 for the years 2008 to 2015 and 0 otherwise. We use a two-step system GMM procedure, panel data during the period: 2000 to 2015 and the 
sample includes firms from the G5 countries.  Coefficient values are listed at the first row at bold and t-statistics are in second row. The symbol * 
means that the variables is significant at 10% level, ** means that the variable is significant at 5% level, and *** means that the variable is significant 
at the 1% level.   
Variables 
Market Leverage Book Leverage LTDT STDT 
BD (1) CMD (2) BD (3) CMD (4) BD (5) CMD (6) BD (7) CMD (8) 
LEVERAGE 0,625*** 0,567*** 0,522*** 0,433*** 0,403*** 0,358*** 0,394*** 0,358*** 
 170,925 131,757 139,982 98,695 82,865 62,713 80,890 62,693 
PROF -0,294*** -0,039*** -0,254*** -0,122*** 0,006 0,004 -0,020 -0,006 
 -49,168 -24,525 -49,032 -48,146 0,440 0,991 -1,460 -1,256 
TANG 0,196*** 0,117*** 0,179*** 0,090*** 0,143*** 0,114*** -0,147*** -0,115*** 
 23,814 15,355 24,406 7,712 7,863 6,411 -8,036 -6,455 
GWOP -0,013*** -0,006*** 0,004*** 0,002*** -0,001 0,000 -0,001 -0,000 
 -20,176 -24,368 7,322 4,625 -0,722 -0,471 -0,347 -0,569 
SIZE 0,027*** 0,014*** 0,011*** 0,009*** 0,012*** 0,012*** -0,011*** -0,013*** 
 19,939 16,125 10,183 7,205 4,280 5,630 -3,797 -5,671 
NDTS -0,023 -0,095*** -0,035* 0,325*** -0,022 -0,493*** 0,039 0,492*** 
 -1,182 -3,376 -1,958 7,300 -0,516 -6,976 0,884 6,970 
GGGD -0,042** 0,021*** -0,066*** -0,006 0,030 -0,018* -0,030 0,018* 
 -2,230 5,382 -3,837 -0,878 0,699 -1,837 -0,711 1,814 
CAB 0,030 -0,027*** 0,064*** 0,007 -0,023 0,018* 0,024 -0,017* 
 1,618 -6,611 3,737 1,070 -0,547 1,695 0,562 -1,670 
DCRISIS 0,041*** 0,030*** 0,002 0,000 0,001 0,008* -0,003 -0,009** 
 31,521 16,626 1,618 0,114 0,324 1,936 -0,934 -2,023 
CONSTANT 0,153*** -0,014 0,009 -0,030 -0,159*** 0,235*** 0,747*** 0,409*** 
 8,271 -1,107 0,610 -1,503 -3,909 7,076 18,097 12,234 
         
Observations 40 127 36 344 41 557 38 222 38 010 30 364 38 010 30 364 
Number of firms 2 965 2 908 2 965 2 911 2 905 2 758 2 905 2 758 
R-squared 0,897 0,806 0,842 0,684 0,621 0,607 0,617 0,607 
Adjusted R-squared 0,889 0,789 0,830 0,658 0,589 0,568 0,585 0,568 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This dissertation analyses how firms that operate in capital market-oriented 
economies and bank-oriented economies determine their capital structure, taking into 
account the impact of institutional variables and the subprime crisis. The mains objectives 
are: investigate the effect of a financial shock on capital structure choices of a company, 
analyze the possible implications of institutional environment on capital structure 
decisions and analyze if firms have a target capital structure and, if do, what the speed of 
adjustment for that target. 
For these analyses, we used a sample that comprises 5,923 firms (443 French, 367 
German, 2,155 Japanese, 763 U.K., and 2,195 U.S.) related to the Euronext liffe Paris for 
France, Deutsche Boerse AG for Germany, Tokyo for Japan, London for UK and 
NASGAQ and NYSE for US during the period of 2000-2015, panel data and a two-step 
system-GMM procedure with cross section fixed effects. 
The results of this dissertation show that the subprime crisis has a significant impact 
on leverage, and that following this event companies use more debt than equity and use 
more short-term debt than long-term debt. Most profitable companies used less debt and 
companies with more tangible assets and bigger size use more debt and after de subprime 
crisis the intensity increased because fixed assets have a more important role in approval 
of bank financing. The impact of growth opportunities and NDTS change across the 
dependent variables used and across countries. Accordingly to previous literature, for the 
control variables and in contrast with the firm-level variables, the impact on leverage and 
financing choices is inconclusive. Finally, the most strong result is that exist a target of 
leverage confirming the trade-off theory. 
.  
In summary, the strength and the nature of the effect of firm-specific variables as 
well as environmental factors on capital structure choice of a company are dependent on 
the economic and legal traditions of the country in which the company is located. 
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The main limitations of our study are related to the fact that we don’t take into 
account the industrial effects, because it is known that some industries are characterized 
by high leverage, while others are recognised by having low leverage. Additionally, 
because we use a two-step system-GMM procedure we must have five consecutive 
observations, therefore some companies have been eliminated according to this criteria. 
Future research can include more firm-level variables such as effective tax rate, 
earnings volatility, dividend payout ratio or share price performance. Besides that, it can 
also be used other control variables like a term structure of the interest rate, a M&A 
activity or a market equity premium. It would also be important to analyse industrial 
effects, because as referred some industries have typically more leverage than others. 
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